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Abstract The natural world demonstrates signs of spatial–
temporal order, an order that appears to us through a series
of recognizable, recurring and consecutive patterns, i.e.
regularities in forms, functions, behaviors, events and
processes. These patterns lend insight into the modes and
tempos of evolution and thus into the units, levels, and
mechanisms that underlie the evolutionary hierarchy.
Contributors to this special issue analyze converging pat-
terns in the biological and sociocultural realm across and
beyond classic divisions between micro- and macro-evo-
lution; horizontal/reticulate and vertical evolution; phy-
logeny, ontogeny and ecology; synchronic and diachronic
sociocultural and linguistic research; and tree and network
diagrams. Explanations are sought in complexity theory,
major transitions of evolution, and process and mechanism
approaches to change; and consequences for notions such
as ‘‘life’’, ‘‘species’’, ‘‘biological individuality’’, ‘‘units’’
and ‘‘levels’’ of evolution are given.
Keywords Evolutionary patterns  Horizontal
transmission  Vertical transmission  Microevolution 
Macroevolution  Hierarchy theory  Systems theory 
Diachronic versus synchronic research  Mode and tempo
of evolution
Introduction
In an anthology on Interpreting the hierarchy in nature,
Rieppel and Grande (1994: 227) stated that ‘‘[s]ome of the
most fundamental issues that scientists and philosophers
face in evolutionary studies today concerns the relation of
systematic patterns observed in nature to evolutionary
process theories proposed to explain them…’’. Today,
some 20 years later, the problem remains as fundamental
as ever and has expanded from the biological to the
sociocultural sciences that now also incorporate an evolu-
tionary outlook to explain the change sociocultural phe-
nomena go through in time and space.
The study of evolution often involves a choice between
examining the various trajectories taken by natural kinds in
history and providing a hierarchical, systematic and/or
chronological sequence of events; or examining the causal
processes that underlie the observed changes through time
by listing the various mechanisms that induce evolution
(Levinton and Futuyma 1982; Eldredge 1985; Rieppel and
Grande 1994; Nuño de la Rosa and Etxeberria 2012;
Gontier 2015b). The former involves a descriptive and
pattern-based approach to evolutionary change, and the
trajectories of natural kinds either become depicted in
historical timelines or phylogenetic tree diagrams (Mayr
1942; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980) that, due to the large
scale of analysis, involves macro-evolutionary sciences.
The latter involves a process-based, often mechanistic way
to explain change, and here, micro-evolutionary fields have
favored natural selection acting on organisms and genes as
the explanatory mechanism (Mayr 1961; Williams 1966;
Dawkins 1976).
In linguistic (de Saussure 1916) and sociocultural
(Malinowski 1922; Durkheim 1922) sciences, the pattern
versus process/mechanism distinction is known as the
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diachronic/historical and synchronic/structural–functional
approach. Scholars active in diachronic research examine
the history of changes natural kinds have undergone in time
and space which therefore also involves a macrolevel
analysis. Synchronic scholars focus on a particular moment
in time, often the present, and try and find the causes for
the current functions of a sociocultural or linguistic system,
which consequently involves a microlevel analysis (Gon-
tier 2012, 2015b).
The methodological distinction is not absolute, either in
the biological or the sociocultural sciences. In biology,
both approaches were combined by Mayr (1961), in his
paper on Cause and effect in biology. He distinguished
between physiological and developmental biologists who
seek the proximate causes of traits (how we walk or
breath), and evolutionary biologists who ask about the
functions (why we walk or breath). The former involves a
structural-functionalist investigation into the present, i.e.
ontogeny; the latter involves historical and evolutionary
research, phylogeny. Mayr explained that proximate causes
can only be made sense of in light of ultimate ones
(Dobzhansky 1973), and thus that understanding ontogeny
in the present implies knowledge of evolutionary processes
that occurred in the past. This distinction between proxi-
mate and ultimate causes was later introduced into
behavioral studies by Tinbergen (1963) and adopted by the
sociocultural evolutionary sciences.
This special issue focusses on evolutionary patterns, but
following Mayr and Tinbergen, in no way excludes process
theories that try and explain the patterns. Pattern and pro-
cess are often intrinsically related, and any and all theo-
rizing on evolutionary patterns furthermore involves an
identification of the units and levels of analysis, which
happens either in nature or in a theoretical hierarchy.
The relation between pattern and process has become
more obvious in recent years in biology due to macroevo-
lutionary research on the mode and tempo of Darwinian
evolution (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Eldredge and Cracraft
1980), as well as systematic gene-based analyses (Woese
2004) that prove beyond reasonable doubt that besides ver-
tical patterns of descent that can be explained by natural
selection theory, life’s history is characterized by reticula-
tions or network-like patterns. Both gradual and punctuated
equilibria patterns can be explained by natural selection
theory, but especially the study of the former has in addition
to the pattern of gradual descent with modification brought
forth research on patterns of morphological stasis and
developmental constraints. Reticulate patterns are explained
by processes and mechanisms that underlie lateral gene
transfer, symbiogenesis, and hybridization (for an overview,
see Gontier 2015a) and these raise questions not only on the
tempos but also on the various modes of evolution.
While gradual descent with modification can indeed
typify aspects of sociocultural and linguistic change
through time and space, reticulations also characterize
diffusion studies on the world’s languages and cultures
(Kroeber 1923; Croft 2000, 2002). The network-like pat-
terns that typify cultural and linguistic information
exchange used to make anthropologists and linguists
refrain from evolutionary research, but today, the wide
recognition of reticulate evolution in the biological sci-
ences, together with the implementation of evolutionary
theory into the sociocultural sciences, is bringing forth new
means to model the often rapid horizontal transmission of
sociocultural and linguistic traits (Croft 2000, 2002;
Atkinson 2010; Nelson-Sathi et al. 2013, 2014).
Tree and network diagrams also no longer confine
themselves to the historical, systematic or diachronic study
of natural kinds. In fact, many evolutionary diagrams today
remain historically unrooted, and depict phenomena within
both the biological and sociocultural realms that occur in
what might be called the ‘‘living or continuous present
(Lebendige Gegenwart)’’, a term borrowed from Husserl
(1928), or what both biologists and sociocultural scientists
designate as the ‘‘economy’’ or ‘‘ecology’’ of nature, which
follows Haeckel (1866) who defined it as the ‘‘conditions
of existence’’. Evo-devo schools have taught us that these
conditions of existence are partly determined by the ‘‘inner
environment’’ (Gould and Lewontin 1979) or ontological
and developmental processes; while evo-eco schools focus
on how the ‘‘outer environment,’’ made up of other indi-
viduals (Van Valen 1976) and abiotic phenomena (Vrba
1985), determines the economy of nature.
Besides lending insights into phylogeny, ontogeny (that
encompasses morphological form and functional behavior),
and ecology, recurring patterns often provide the first entry
points to examine how information is exchanged, and they
help to identify the units of evolution, the levels where they
evolve, and the mechanisms and processes that underlie
their change (Gontier 2011). As such and beyond evolu-
tionary diagrams that track (aspects of) natural kinds in
time and space, recurring patterns underlie theoretical
generalizations.
Defining Patterns and Their Functionality
for Evolutionary Research
Patterns are regularities in forms, functions, behaviors,
events, and processes that recur in time and space. They
lend insight into the modes and tempos of evolution and
thus into the units, levels, and mechanisms that underlie the
evolutionary hierarchy and its major transitions. Patterns
can be deduced from observed data, simulations and
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models of the natural world, and in all cases, they require
an observer.
Much of science and philosophy is characterized by
examining how well the phenomenological world we live
in, i.e. the biological reality we perceive through our
observations and cognition, match with the world as it is in
itself (Gontier and Bradie, forthcoming). Our observations
are partly determined by our evolved physical and neu-
rocognitive constitution that is particularly well-suited to
deal with a world of middle-sized objects (Vollmer 1984);
and partly by the scientific instruments we have developed
over the years that enables us to observe and analyze the
micro- and macroworld. Scientific simulations and models
express our accumulated data and knowledge and depend
upon theoretical premises defined by scientific paradigms
(Kuhn 1962) that in turn find their roots in sociocultural
intuitions (Pinxten 1997). Patterns are therefore often the-
oretical constructs that on an epistemological level enable
us to conduct scientific research and the delineation of
patterns encompasses a cultural scientific practice.
How ‘‘real’’ patterns are, i.e. how and if a pattern con-
verges with the actual, ontological state of the universe, is
something we cannot fully determine which is why all
scientific research is bounded by the epistemic framework
one works in. Nonetheless, there are a couple of criteria
that we can list to which patterns need to adhere before
they qualify as objects of scientific research and practice.
In all cases, the observed regularity requires repetition.
And like any object of study, patterns also need to meet
requirements of independent confirmation and a failure to
falsify the observed regularity by members of the scientific
community.
Pievani opens the issue and further explains how
recurring patterns in natural history function as heuristic
tools of scientific discovery that enable us to build the
scientific program. Following Eldredge (1999), he defines
evolutionary patterns narrowly as ‘‘regularities and recur-
rent schemes in the transformational processes of organ-
isms and species’’ and generally as ‘‘scheme[s] of repeated
historical processes and events’’. Such regularities
demonstrate that evolution is not a random process.
The most straightforward recurring pattern found in the
transformational process of species is what Darwin (1859)
called ‘‘descent with modification’’. He explained this
pattern by natural selection theory that in turn builds upon
observed patterns of variation, inheritance and fitness of
individual organisms (called the Darwinian principles by
Lewontin 1970), in conjugation with ideas on competition
and a struggle for existence in the economy of nature.
Taken together, these factors underlie shifts in populations
over time which brings forth new species. Darwin postu-
lated such speciation to occur gradually, which today is
confirmed by patterns of phyletic gradualism. In addition,
data demonstrates that speciations often follow a pattern of
punctuated equilibria (Eldredge and Gould 1972), where
long periods of morphological species stability or stasis are
intermitted by short periods of rapid change. Because both
patterns find scientific support, Pievani avers for a more
pluralistic understanding of the means whereby speciation
occurs.
Beyond pluralistic views on speciation, the author
details how scholars have discovered multiple and varied
sources and patterns of variation, not only at a genetic but
also at an epigenetic level which has engendered notions of
inclusive inheritance. Scholars active in evo-devo schools
have observed patterns of developmental constraints and
information channeling, and ideas on niche construction
and kin or group selection alter how we define environ-
mental selection and competition. These discoveries have
often gone hand in hand with polemic debates on the
adequacy of the Modern Synthesis and whether or not we
need to extend it. Pievani takes the Laland et al. (2014)
article as point of departure to argue that though the plu-
rality of patterns do not falsify the Neo-Darwinian frame-
work, they nonetheless require integration into a new meta-
theory of evolution. Pievani suggests that Eldredge’ hier-
archy theory, that distinguishes between a genealogical and
ecological hierarchy, could serve as the basis of that larger
framework. The genealogical hierarchy integrates the
Darwinian principles of differential variation, inheritance
and fitness, while the ecological hierarchy encompasses the
different levels of environmental selection along with more
general processes of matter-energy exchange that take
place within the economy of nature.
Trees, Networks and the Patterns of Transmission,
Affinity, Diffusion and Dispersal
A large part of evolutionary research is concerned with
defining the units of evolution and consequently with
defining information, examining its transmission and
exchange. Population and molecular biologists define the
unit of information as the gene, and comparative genetic
research enables scholars to draw genealogical pedigrees
and phylogenetic trees that depict evolutionary relatedness
amongst species. Tree models demonstrate a vertical pat-
tern of common descent with modification amongst the
various species and also lend insight into speciation pro-
cesses and biodiversity.
The sociocultural and linguistic sciences, and also eco-
logical, reticulate and biomedical evolutionary sciences
often define the unit of evolution more broadly in order to
include the horizontal and reticulate exchange of infor-
mation that typifies language borrowing or culture contact,
the differential exchange of matter and energy that takes
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place in the economy of nature, and the transmission and
acquisition of foreign and extra-nuclear DNA, organelles,
or microorganisms that influence health and disease.
Beyond genealogical and therefore vertical modes of
transmission, these scholars examine:
1. Horizontal transmission of information (possibly fol-
lowed by vertical descent) between contemporary
organisms often belonging to distinct species—exam-
ples in the biological sciences include hybridization
and lateral gene transfer (which are both gene-based),
symbiosis and symbiogenesis (organism-based); and in
the behavioral, sociocultural and linguistic sciences
examples include the intraspecific diffusion of behav-
ioral, linguistic and cultural traits (not all of which are
matter-based), which due to incoming evidence of
hybridization events within the hominin lineage
(Curnoe et al. 2015; Green et al. 2010; Prüfer et al.
2014; Vernot and Akey 2014) now have to be taken to
an interspecific level of analysis;
2. Oblique or indirect vertical transmission traditionally
defined by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) in the
sociocultural sciences as information exchange going
from one or more non-kin members of an older
generation to individuals belonging to a younger
generation—examples include unguided observational
learning as it occurs in our and other primate species or
master-apprentice relations;
3. Directed transmission, also defined in the sociocultural
sciences, by Campbell (1965) and Boyd and Richerson
(1985), as guided variation and information
exchange—teaching, for example (the difference with
oblique transmission lies in the latter’s emphasis on
information exchange from an older to a younger
generation, while directed transmission puts emphasis
on the variation bias that intentional teaching brings
forth); and also biologists debate whether or not
genetic mutations (Cairns et al. 1988), lateral gene
transfers (Popa et al. 2011), eco-evo-devo phenomena
such as phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard 2003)
and niche construction (Gould and Lewontin 1979), or
physical, biochemical and developmental constraints
and affordances (Turing 1952; Gould 1977, 1986;
Pearson et al. 2005) are random, contingent or
directed; and
4. Reversed transmission, where in the sociocultural
domain younger generations transmit information to
older generations—think of a grandchild teaching his
grandparents how to use a cell phone (Gontier 2006b);
and in the biological domain, especially during epige-
netic changes the flow of information becomes
reversed, going from proteins to RNA to DNA (Jacob
and Monod 1961). This illustrates instances of
downward causation (Campbell 1974b) where, when
looked at from a hierarchical perspective, upper or
later evolved levels influence the evolution of older or
lower levels (cultural practices change biological
evolution, for example).
When these interactions and informational transmission
modes are modelled, they result in network diagrams that
display reticulation patterns. Beyond the study of interac-
tions and information exchange, network diagrams are
inherent to biogeographic and sociocultural ecological
research where scholars examine the non-genetic distribu-
tion/dispersal/migration/diffusion and occupancy/den-
sity/diversity of natural kinds. Network diagrams also
emerge from non-genetic comparative research where
scholars map morphological and other affinities.
Morrison contributes a historical overview on the origin
of tree and network analysis in both the biological and
linguistic sciences, and he outlines the various method-
ologies used to depict genealogical relations and more
general affinities. The differential use of tree and network
iconography, for the author, lends insight into just how
complex the scientific community perceives relationships
that exist between natural kinds to be. Both trees and
networks are part of graph theory, where nodes (break
points or intersections) become connected by edges (lines).
Genealogical trees are directed acyclic graphs and there-
fore illustrate (multi-)linearity in time. Networks are more
complex because they allow reticulations between nodes.
Today pedigrees display the genealogical relationship
amongst individuals on a micro-scale, a relationship that
is understood in genetic terms, while phylogenies portray
the genealogical relationship there exists amongst groups
of individuals on a macro-scale. Pedigrees and phyloge-
nies are often pictured as trees where diverging branches
lend insight into vertical descent lines, but the author
notes, these trees are often simplified networks, especially
when they portray the genealogy of sexually reproducing
species. Reticulations represent affinities or interactions
and contact that occurs between species, languages and
cultures. Networks furthermore enable depictions of the
dispersal and diffusion of languages and the biodiversity
and biogeography of life. Affinity or interaction diagrams
often remain historically unrooted, and Morrison notes
that during sociocultural situations, no vertical time-con-
sistency is required because the directionality of infor-
mation flow can change. Scholars are nonetheless
developing several ways to infer historical relationships in
these networks, but at present no unifying mathematical
technique exists.
Morrison goes on to analyze how patterns produced by
diagrams relate to the processes and mechanisms of evo-
lution. Natural history knows three types of processes:
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divergence, convergence and parallelism, and all are
explained by a variety of mechanisms. Processes of
divergence are brought about by mechanisms of natural
selection; convergence results from mechanisms underly-
ing recombination, re-assortment, hybridization, intro-
gression, lateral gene transfer, and symbiogenesis. Parallel
evolution occurs when unrelated species evolve similar to
one another, either due to chance similarity or due to
similar selection pressures. Divergence will lead to tree
diagrams while divergence with convergence leads to
networks, and parallel evolution obscures clear tracking of
information flow. The author cautions that patterns
emerging from mathematical analyses merely procure
hypotheses on natural history, and because they are often
similar in appearance, they disable a straightforward link-
age to causal mechanisms of change.
Like Morrison, Kressing examines how before the
introduction of natural selection theory, historical linguists
of the nineteenth century mapped the origin and dispersal
of several of the world’s largest language families, the
diffusion of their vocabulary and the development of their
grammatical features, by making use of network diagrams.
Network diagrams that demonstrate affinity were also
common in biological schools and Kressing in particular
highlights how, on a meta-level, this induced an intense
cross-fertilization between linguists and biologists in what
regards the exchange of tools and modelling techniques for
tracing the history of natural kinds. The adoption of natural
selection theory resulted in a steady decline in the use of
network diagrams in favor of vertical diagrams in both the
biological and sociocultural sciences.
Attempts to model sociocultural and linguistic evolution
in tree models gave way to historicist theories that bestow
unilineal explanations of sociocultural change. Often
associated with stage thinking, some languages and cul-
tures became defined as ‘‘under-’’developed or ‘‘primitive’’
in comparison to Western cultures. These often racist and
evolutionist instead of evolutionary theories were ques-
tioned at the turn of the twentieth century, by schools of
Social Anthropology in Britain, Ethnologie in France,
Völkerkunde in Germany, and Cultural Anthropology in
North America. All fiercely combatted the unilineal
assumptions made on cultural evolution and often ended up
rejecting evolutionary theories of sociocultural change
altogether, in favor of notions such as historical particu-
larism or diffusionism that continued to examine horizontal
information exchange. The horizontal diffusion of lin-
guistic traits became studied by areal typologies of lan-
guages. Because diffusions involve phenomena such as
language borrowing and culture contact, the fields of
anthropology and linguistics developed independently from
the overall biological sciences, often by developing new
techniques to map reticulations.
Eventually evolutionary thinking became reintroduced
into sociocultural research in the first half of the twentieth
century, and today, both tree and network diagrams are
used to understand the historical and evolutionary change
languages and cultures go through in time. Kressing
explains how this reintroduction is again due to an intense
interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, where techniques used
to model hybridization and the horizontal transfer of
genetic material are implemented to study sociocultural
and linguistic change.
Mesoudi and de Voogt elucidate on some of the simi-
larities and particularities that exist between biological and
cultural evolution. When Neo-Darwinians study the evo-
lution of species, they investigate genetically transmitted
information, while sociocultural scientists such as Mesoudi
define cultural evolution as ‘‘socially transmitted informa-
tion, including beliefs, knowledge, skills and practices’’.
Though genetic information is quite different from cultural
information, both types of information create variation, and
both can be transmitted, if not by genes then by social
learning practices. Variation, together with differential
inheritance (or transmission) and fitness (or selection), are
the three Darwinian principles according to which natural
selection operates, and Mesoudi explains how these prin-
ciples can characterize cultural evolution on a micro- and
macroscale. He reviews from a methodological point of
view how scholars have applied concepts, tools and tech-
niques developed in the biological sciences to explain
cultural change within and amongst populations.
Such research has elicited large-scale patterns and trends
in sociocultural evolution, of which Mesoudi highlights
some of the most intriguing ones. For one, social learning
is payoff biased and conformist. Decisions taken at an
individual level to follow the majority, because it is more
rewarding for the individual, generate patterns of group
conformity at a population level, which facilitates group
formation and cohesion. Secondly, cognitive biases drive
cultural evolution toward cultural attractors (Claidière and
Sperber 2007). Cultural information (or variation) is often
directionally altered by the individual, who modifies the
information in such a way that it becomes cognitively
accessible to that individual, which biases not only the
information but also guides the trajectory it takes. Trans-
mission chain studies on storytelling conducted by the
author, for example, demonstrate that during iterated
transmissions of the same story amongst different indi-
viduals, details get lost and the story becomes more generic
over time (which is comparable to McShea’s machinifica-
tion trend, discussed later in the text). Human cognition
thus actively shapes cultural evolution by providing
directional constraints on the types of information that can
become passed on. Thirdly, and from an ecological point of
view, group size, population density and migration can
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influence the evolution of cultural complexity. Smaller
groups have less cultural variation in skills and practices
while larger groups have more variation because there are
more individuals to learn form. Isolated groups often lose
complex skills over time. Fourthly, phylogenetic methods
used to reconstruct the dispersal of language families
demonstrate that in addition to gradual patterns of change,
language families also undergo ‘‘pulses’’ and ‘‘pauses’’
(Gray and Jordan 2000), a pattern that is comparable to the
punctuated equilibria found in the fossil record; and
scholars are more and more able to map the reticulations
intrinsic to sociocultural change.
For Mesoudi, cultural macro-evolution finds its causality
in micro-evolutionary processes because the large-scale
patterns or trends can be explained by referring to
dynamics occurring at the micro- and mesoscale. The
benefit of cultural macro-evolutionary studies is that it
enables scholars to compare cultures, which was consid-
ered impossible by the historical particularists reviewed by
Kressing. Contrary to sociobiological schools of thought
and evolutionary psychologists, who investigate the prox-
imate causes of cultural behavior by tracing culture back to
genes and investigating inclusive genetic fitness, the author
argues that cultural evolution can play an ultimate causal
role, by driving behavior to novel equilibria and by intro-
ducing a second inheritance system based upon social
learning strategies.
De Voogt exemplifies the peculiar nature of cultural
traits with writing systems and board games. Both are
material artifacts invented by humans and both have a
physical, material appearance and a set of culturally-de-
fined rules on which letters to write or how to play the
game. Changes in either the rules or the physical appear-
ance can be decoupled from one another and these changes
enable a variety of qualitative field work and quantitative
data analysis (modelling), including diachronic (historical),
genealogical (via their human inventors), biogeographic
and ecological research.
The author reviews how writing systems have been
borrowed and modified from neighboring languages, even
when they form part of different language families, and
they have been transmitted vertically, horizontally and
obliquely. Board games cross linguistic and cultural
boundaries, and have a wide geographical dispersal. Each
variation appears to undergo its own peculiar modes of
transmission. The rules or information on how to write or
manufacture board games are transmitted via language, but
language does not always appear to pose a cultural
boundary during the transmission process.
Cultural transmission of information is much less rigid
than genetic transmission, and these aspects warn against
macro-evolutionary studies that, because of the scale
involved, often homogenize the material cultural traits they
track in time and space. This continues to result in divided
epistemological stances between classic archaeological and
anthropological fields that favor ethnographic descriptions
or adopt cultural diffusion theory, and historical and
comparative linguists and archeologists that adopt Dar-
winian cultural evolution models. de Voogt points out how
both fields can benefit from each other’s datasets and
modelling techniques, and he gives some useful directions
for future research.
Transitioning from the Cosmic to the Biological
to the Psycho-Social
Ever since Plato (Harte 2002), we have been fascinated
with how wholes decompose into parts and how parts
connect to one another to form larger wholes thereby
giving structural order to the universe along with identity
and individuality to its compositions. The ancient Greeks
distinguished between different cosmic scales, the micro-
meso- and macrocosmos, which formed an embedded
hierarchy that later became redefined as the inorganic,
organic and super-organic by Hutton (1788) in the geo- and
biological sciences and Spencer (1876) in the sociocultural
sciences. The inorganic, organic and super-organic division
still reflects the way in which we organize academic dis-
ciplines today (Smocovitis 1996), from particle physics and
chemistry over the evolutionary sciences to the earth and
planetary sciences.
Neither of these distinctions however correspond with
the current standard models on the origin of the universe
and the evolution of life (Gontier 2015b), which is why
Huxley (1942, 1957) redefined the hierarchy in a
diachronically more realistic line up as going from the
cosmic to the biological to the psychosocial. These hier-
archies correspond with the three most puzzling problems
science wants to solve: the origin of the universe, the origin
of life, and the origin of neurocognitive and sociocultural
behavior. For all three problems, scholars have long
assumed breakpoints: there was no universe and a moment
in time and space, as Newton would say, when it came into
existence, a period where there only existed inorganic
material and a period where living organisms emerge, and
a period where life was only defined by its genetic and
biochemical constitution and a period where that life
transcends its material constitution to display behavior,
including of a cognitive and sociocultural kind.
Today the assumed boundaries and break points have
cleared room for qualitative and quantitative transition
thinking and the changes are redefined either in evolu-
tionary terms or in terms of rises in complexity, or both.
Many physicists suspect that the big bang does not mark
the beginning of the (single) cosmos (Borde et al. 2003);
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accumulating evidence points toward multiple origins of
life which in turn questions the idea that all species share
common descent (Woese 2004; Margulis and Sagan 2000);
and even sociobiology is nowadays applied to understand
the differential behavior portrayed by prokaryotic beings
(Dunny et al. 2008; Nadell et al. 2009). The fuzzy
boundaries between the inorganic, organic and superor-
ganic, or the cosmic, biological and psychosocial have
repercussions for how we define life and culture. While the
origin of the universe is a question for physicists, in this
volume Kolb examines the origin of life out of non-living
matter, and Bradie and Bouzat investigate the evolution of
cultural beings from biological individuals.
Turning to the origin of life, the standard view defines
life upon its structural composition as that what is made up
of genes, proteins and a cell, and it understands the single
cell as the most basic unit of life (Margulis and Sagan
2000; Schrödinger 1942). These structural elements are all
built up from inorganic matter, no structural ‘‘life element’’
can be found. Nucleotides together with phosphates and
sugar build genes, amino acids build proteins, and the cell
membrane is built up from proteins and lipids. Such
implies that the origin of life involves a transition from the
inorganic to the organic, and causality for that transition is
sought in the inorganic realm, because what did not yet
exist cannot be counted responsible for what came into
being.
In a modern cell, genes encode for proteins, including
proteins and lipids that build its membrane but disputes
arise on how life originated and which came first, the
building blocks of proteins (Kauffman 1971, 2011), genes
(Orgel 1973; Eigen 1971) or cells (Oparin 1968; Oparin
and Gladilin 1980; Fox and Dose 1977). Morphological
definitions are accompanied with functional definitions and
with how we causally define life’s evolution, in terms of
the evolutionary mechanisms involved. Functionally, life is
defined by its ability to metabolize and (self-)maintain as
well as its ability to replicate information and (self-)re-
produce. Many biochemical entities can self-assemble and
self-maintain without the presence of natural selection.
Rather, they arise through what used to be called ‘‘spon-
taneous generation’’ or a ‘‘natural attraction’’ that exists
between molecules, which we today can causally explain
by referring to physical and biochemical laws and mech-
anisms. Self-replication is gene-based and therefore asso-
ciates with the origin of genes as information systems and
the introduction of the three Darwinian principles (differ-
ential variation, reproduction and fitness/selection) acting
on these information systems.
The origin of self-replicating genes is hypothesized to
have occurred in an RNA world. For Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry (1995), for example, and following scholars
such as Eigen (1971), the transition from non-living matter
to life associates with the passing of the Darwinian
threshold (Woese 1967), i.e. when the Darwinian principles
become reached. Evidence for the RNA world hypothesis
(Woese 1967; Gilbert 1986) is found in ribozymes, RNA
molecules that can function both as genes and enzymes
(Cech et al. 1982; Guerrier-Takada et al. 1983). Before the
current transcription and translation machinery was intro-
duced where DNA (information) encodes for proteins
(metabolism) via RNA, RNA could have both stored its
information and acted as its own catalyst by performing the
catabolic and anabolic functions required to replicate itself.
The division of labor that subsequently arose between
DNA, RNA and proteins involves a rise in complexity and
is hypothesized to have occurred later in time.
While it is highly likely that ribozymes precede the
origin of the genetic code and its complex translation
machinery, we also have clear evidence, through the
Miller-Urey experiments (Miller 1953), that amino acids
could have formed in the early atmosphere independently
of genes that encode for them. In fact, over 500 amino
acids have been described so far, and only 20 are encoded
for by genes and put to use in the formation of living
entities. Amino acids can ‘‘spontaneously’’ (within the
limits of chemical and physical laws) form bonds and
catalyze into larger molecules such as polymers where
single units become repeated into larger chains, thereby
introducing a form of molecular reproduction that is void
of natural selection based upon replication (Kauffman
1971, 2011). The ‘‘naked’’ RNA world could have included
such chemical inhabitants, or it could have been preceded
by such an era of biochemical evolution.
The nucleotides that build genes are also found inde-
pendently in the atmosphere and they are scattered through
space (meteorites that fall on earth often contain them). But
their presumed distance apart and the relative short ‘‘half-
life’’ nucleotides seem to have, makes it less likely for
these entities to have been in contact with one another
outside a compartment such as a (proto-)cell. In general,
‘‘naked genes’’ are very vulnerable to breakdown by
environmental causes and a (proto-)cellular structure
would better protect the processes of compartmentalization
of replicators into chromosomes, or the establishment of a
translation machinery. A cell would also bring the various
components closer together, thereby increasing the possi-
bility to interact.
Kolb describes experimental research on such protocells
that could have preceded or facilitated the RNA world.
Coacervates are biochemical cell-like structures that can be
synthesized under lab conditions that simulate the primitive
earth (Oparin’s 1968, 1969, 1980; Fox and Dose 1977).
Coacervates are able to encapsulate and absorb chemical
matter, they can facilitate catalytic reactions inside their
structure, and they can split into daughter cells and thus
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undergo rudimentary forms of reproduction, all in the
absence of genetic material. Oparin’s coacervates were
made up of gelatin (polypeptides) and arabic gum
(polysaccharides), but only the latter can be artificially
composed from prebiotic elements. Kolb therefore exper-
imented with a structure that is able to self-construct from
the elements present in prebiotic chemistry. Her AOT-
molecule (Dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate) can form coac-
ervates that are able to function as chemical reactors.
In the second part of her paper, Kolb investigates various
definitions of life, including definitions that explain living
organisms as entities that are able to self-maintain and
reproduce through replicating genes, and tests them against
curiosities such as viruses. Viruses are entities that can self-
maintain but not self-replicate, for the latter they require the
metabolism of living organisms. Kolb redefines life as a
qualitative change in the complexity of organic chemical
systems that is characterized by the ability of temporal self-
maintenance and self-preservation. This temporal dimension
enables her to include viruses that integrate into a host
(during the lysogenic stage) amongst the living. The status of
viruses as transitioning entities between the living and the
dead is also reviewed by Casiraghi et al., discussed later.
The transition from the organic to the superorganic in
turn has been redefined in terms of gene-culture co-evo-
lutionary theories (Boyd and Richerson 1985) that yield
ideas on ‘‘dual inheritance’’. The rationale behind these
movements is that biological organisms are able to display
cultural behavior partly because of their biological con-
stitution (they evolved culture), but once cultures exist,
these cultural systems themselves evolve, often in ways
different from biological evolution. As Mesoudi noted,
culture can demonstrate forms of ‘‘directed selection’’, and
not all cultural behavior can be causally explained by
genes. For that reason, he defines cultural evolution as
‘‘socially transmitted information, including beliefs,
knowledge, skills and practices’’, and he emphasizes that
this information evolves according to Darwinian but not
neo-Darwinian, genetic selection.
Dual inheritance theories find their origin in ethological
(Lorenz 1941, 1958, 1977, 1985; Tinbergen 1963),
behaviorist (Skinner 1953, 1984), comparative psycholog-
ical (Piaget 1950) and evolutionary epistemological
(Campbell 1959, 1960, 1997; Bradie 1986; Munz 1993)
schools of thought. These schools commenced the scien-
tific study of behavior and the cognition required to display
it, and both cognition and behavior became understood as
evolved traits that from an evolutionary epistemological
perspective enables organisms to embody, acquire and
conceptualize knowledge (for overviews see Gontier
2006a, b; Gontier and Bradie, forthcoming). Lorenz, for
example, aimed to develop a taxonomy of behavior and
cognition that could map onto genealogical phylogenies,
Piaget distinguished various stages of human cognition,
and Campbell attempted to identify the phases and hier-
archical transitions in knowledge acquisition from bacteria
onward.
These scholars define knowledge broadly as not merely
encompassing scientific thought and practice, language or
culture, it includes anatomical traits, senses and percep-
tions, mobility, instincts, and cellular processes. Today we
know that even genes can produce different traits
depending upon their location and time of activation within
the genome, and such can be considered differential
behavior that manifests a form of evolved knowledge. This
implies that the acquisition of knowledge need not require
cognition, consciousness or intentionality. Any and all
biologically evolved traits are understood as inductively
acquired types of knowledge on how to act within the
internal (bodily) and external environment (Lorenz 1941;
Campbell 1974a). Processes such as mimicry illustrate
how, through natural selection or ‘‘blind variation and
selective retention,’’ adaptive anatomical and behavioral
traits have evolved that enable species to survive and
reproduce differentially, and such traits literally embody
evolved knowledge on the environment and how to act in
it. For Campbell (1965), and before Lewontin (1970),
‘‘blind variation and selective retention’’ characterized the
(Darwinian) principles that are recursively repeated at all
levels of knowledge acquisition. By applying natural
selection theory not only to the evolution of anatomical
form but also to behavior and cognition, these scholars
undid the ontogeny-phylogeny divide and loosened the
boundaries between form and function (structural anatomy
versus behavior or cognition).
Culture, which is one type of knowledge, can be found
in numerous species, and here too drawing the boundaries
between biological or social and cultural behavior becomes
a matter of definition. Bradie and Bouzat investigate how
cultural beings evolved from biological beings, and how
the decoupling between the cultural and biological realm
can come about. They distinguish three separate phases that
follow one another: non-cultural species gave way to proto-
cultural species which gave way to fully cultural species.
Crucial to understanding the transitions from one phase
to the next for the authors is the notion of reaction norms
(Schlichting and Pigliucci 1998). Reaction norms refer to
the amount of plasticity genotypes have, via their pheno-
types, to react differentially toward various environmental
conditions. Non-cultural organisms possess genotypes with
little to no plasticity (their reaction norms are fully deter-
mined by their genes or by fixed action patterns that are
triggered by environmental responses), while cultural
phenotypes show a high level of independence of their
genotype (because through learning, they possess a wide
variety of behavioral responses).
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The scholars explain how the early stages in cultural
evolution can be causally explained by Darwinian pro-
cesses acting on geno-and phenotypes, while the later
stages of cultural evolution cannot because cultural traits
are displayed autonomously from the genome and the
transmission modes and mechanisms whereby cultural
traits evolve are different from genetic selection. For that
reason, the biological capacity to evolve culture has to be
decoupled from the modes by which cultural traits change,
which gives way to the dual inheritance system that is
characterized by a dual causality. Methodologically
speaking, this distinction correlates with the division
between two research programs in evolutionary episte-
mology introduced earlier by Bradie (1986): the EEM or
evolution of enabling mechanisms program, and the EET
program that investigates the products or outcomes of
cultural change.
Complexity, Hierarchies, Transitions and Trends
Evolutionary biology has mostly been defined at a meso-
level of analysis. With on the one hand the rise of
molecular genetics and biochemistry (Kay 1996), and on
the other the introduction of macro-evolutionary theory in
biology (Simpson 1944; Eldredge and Gould 1972) as well
as the inclusion of sociocultural and linguistic fields into
the evolutionary sciences (for an overview, see Gontier
2012), the micro- and macro or in- and super-organic have
steadily been incorporated into the evolutionary paradigm.
This has resulted in evo-devo or evolutionary develop-
mental schools (Jacob and Monod 1961; Gould 1977;
Gehring 1992; Jablonka and Lamb 1995; Hall 1999; Car-
roll et al. 2005; Love 2003; Müller 2007; Gilbert and Epel
2008) where scholars investigate how biochemical pro-
cesses and gene-regulatory networks or behavioral patterns
underlie the evolution of organisms and the societies they
form; and evo-eco or evolutionary ecological schools
(Allen and Starr 1982; Eldredge 1985; Salthe 1985; O’Neil
et al. 1986; Fox et al. 2001; Mayhew 2006) where scholars
examine how the different species that make up the biotic
world interact with one another and with the abiotic world.
Evo-devo and evo-eco are currently synthesized into eco-
evo-devo movements (Abouheif et al. 2014) that attempt to
include all layers of reality into the evolutionary paradigm.
From their onset, evolutionary sciences have tried to
scale the origin of the hierarchical layers in time (via the
introduction of timelines), and they have attempted to
assess the various scales based upon their level of com-
plexity. This has brought forth structural hierarchical views
on the very nature of (biological) order, organization or
compositionality (Simon 1962, Koestler 1967, Pattee
1970, 1973); theorizing on the major transitions of
evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995) where
scholars investigate how lower-level parts combine and
actually induce the formation of higher-level systems of
biological organization; and investigations into the possi-
bility of directional change where researchers try and
identify arrow(s) of time (Blum 1951; Gould 1989) or
(recurring) trends (McNamara 1990) in life’s evolved lin-
eages. With Morrison we know that the diagrams used to
depict certain phenomena reflect the levels of complexity
scholars attribute to those phenomena. This also holds for
how we understand hierarchies, transitions and arrows or
trends.
The tripartite hierarchies have become differentiated
into many more levels, and beyond describing the history
of natural kinds, scholars have sought the mechanical
means whereby transitions and trends occur. This ushers
reductionism versus holism debates that have divided sci-
entists on the nature of the scientific enterprise. Should
scholars focus on describing and reconstructing the past, or
explain why things are as they are, by finding the causal
mechanisms of change? This question is accompanied with
queries on historical uniqueness (Gruner 1969), random-
ness (Wimsatt 1980), contingency (Gould 1989), and
determinism (Ayala 1970, Conway Morris 2003) and thus
with the lack or existence of recurring patterns, the (im)-
possibility to predict the future course of evolution, and the
very nature and (un)directedness of change.
Quite some epistemological confusion resides between
research programs that focus on hierarchies, transitions and
arrows or tends in time, and most of it can be explained by
looking into history. Hierarchical thinking is the oldest way
in which scholars have theorized how parts compose to
form larger wholes that are characterized by an increase in
complexity. In the biological sciences, scholars originally
focused on the structures (the patterns that underlie the
composition) of morphological form, instead of research-
ing the relations or interactional patterns that exist between
the components that make up the structure. Scholars such
as Haeckel (1866, 1917) and d’Arcy Thompson (1917)
conceptualized the evolution of life in terms of composi-
tional morphological structures that diachronically and
therefore linearly progress through terminal addition. The
chronological sequence wherein discrete patterns follow
one after the other are interpreted as expressions of a static
developmental staging for which they respectively pro-
posed the ‘‘law of biogenesis’’ and physical and mathe-
matical laws that explain geometric transformations (for a
discussion see Nuño de la Rosa and Etxeberria 2012).
Equally, when DNA was first observed, it was thought
to be a static structure, and theorizing on the nature of
hereditary material originally supposed that one gene
linked to one enzyme (Beadle and Tatum 1941). With the
discovery of DNA (Avery et al. 1944) as the locus of
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hereditary information and the subsequent analysis of its
molecular structure (Watson and Crick 1953), the genetic
code became interpreted as a ‘‘frozen accident’’ (Crick
1968) and only later did the transcription and translation
properties become identified which gave way to more
dynamic views on how form comes about.
Structuralism and structural functionalism is also what
characterizes the onset of the economic (Marx 1890),
anthropological (Malinowski 1922, 1945), sociological
(Durkheim 1922), and linguistic (de Saussure 1916) sci-
ences, where underlying static structures determine the
functions of the whole through the sum of its components
in closed (synchronic) systems.
Today, hierarchy thinking (Eigen 1971; Kauffman 1971;
Pattee 1973; Eldredge 1985; Salthe 1985; O’Neil et al.
1986) no longer follows this rigid and deterministic
structuralism because scholars have long recognized that
the parts not merely compose the whole (and thus that they
do not function as automata), but that the whole ‘‘emerges’’
through the interactions between the parts. Systems, be
they biological, social, linguistic or cultural in kind, are
‘‘partly open and partly closed,’’ and leave room for non-
determinism. Partly influenced by and partly defining the
jargon of systems theory, biophysics, information theory,
cybernetics, and biosemiotics, it are hierarchy builders that
have adopted concepts such as ‘‘division of labor’’; ‘‘in-
formation’’, ‘‘complexity’’, ‘‘(self-)replication’’, ‘‘home-
ostasis’’ or ‘‘self-maintenance and self-organization’’,
‘‘control’’, ‘‘affordances and constraints’’ and ‘‘up- and
downward causation’’ to describe the levels of biomolec-
ular, biological or sociocultural organization, and their
formation, in more dynamic terms. Beyond providing the
jargon to describe these diverse phenomena, hierarchy
builders have been incorporating physical, mathematical
and economic/ecological laws to describe, calculate and
measure the formation of the levels. In this respect, though
numerous often historicist and unilineal attempts have been
made to find laws of sociocultural change, the sociocultural
sciences have failed to find any such laws and they have
abandoned the quest altogether, which is why they favor
descriptive research.
Szathmáry and Maynard Smith (1995) suggested that
the increase in complexity found in natural history is due to
major transitions that involve changes or reorganizations in
the way information is stored and transmitted over time,
but not, for example, how life biogeographically expands
or self-maintains (Benton 2009). Today major transition
thinking follows a life of its own, but the epistemic tradi-
tion does not differ that much from systems and hierarchy
theory because they build on the same vocabulary and they
follow the diachronic (and therefore historically linear)
sequence presented by the original hierarchy thinkers,
going from individual replicators to unicellular to
multicellular life forms and the sociocultural groups they
form. Instead of focusing on the entities that make up the
hierarchy, and the relations and interactions that exist
between them, they often focus more on how the transition
in ‘‘qualitative change’’, ‘‘biological organization’’ or
‘‘complexity’’ comes about. While the original hierarchies
served to describe the nature of the cosmos and later the
evolutionary history of natural kinds in time, transition
scholars try to give an explanation for biological organi-
zation and the transition from one level to another, by
making use of natural selection theory which both implies a
reductionist and a causally mechanistic stance. ‘‘Com-
plexity’’ and ‘‘organization’’ become defined by Lewon-
tin’s ‘‘Darwinian principles’’, i.e. as having differential
variation, inheritance and fitness (or selection), and these
‘‘functional properties’’ not merely define each level of
organization, they are held mechanically responsible for
bringing forth the next (hierarchical) level of biological
organization. So the approach implies a ‘‘Darwinization’’
of the hierarchy, whereby selection theory provides the
explanatory framework for why the hierarchies are what
they are.
The linearity associated with old natural history stage
thinking has from its onset rendered speculations on
directionality in time, which in the sociocultural sciences
associated with historicist and unilineal ideas on culture
(for a history and critique see Boas 1940, Popper 1957, and
Gould 1981), and in the biological sciences associated with
orthogenetic views (for a history and critique see Simpson
1953, Futuyma 2015) that conjoined élan vital movements
that sought the ‘‘driving forces’’ behind the directionality.
Today, questions on directionality continue to be raised in
especially biophysical sciences where the second law of
thermodynamics is considered time’s arrow (Eddington
1928; Prigogine 1980, 1990), and in the macro-evolution-
ary sciences (Gould 1988, 1989; McShea 1998, 2001)
where scholars debate the existence of ‘‘trends’’ and ‘‘ar-
rows in time’’ within existing lineages of a biological
hierarchy. Besides natural selection, other mechanical
explanations are put to use, and many trends can be
explained as random side-effects or passive (McShea and
Brandon 2010), having no apparent causal mechanisms for
their persistence. Szathmáry and Maynard Smith (1995)
furthermore pointed out themselves that the major transi-
tions they distinguish all share the following basic patterns
or trends: (1) independent entities join to form a larger
whole where the individual parts become dependent upon
the newly formed entity (and dependence becomes defined
in terms of replication); (2) loss of independence and
integration into a larger whole introduces task specification
amongst the parts and thus associates with the division of
labor; and (3) all transitions involve changes in how
information is stored, transmitted and communicated.
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These recursive patterns can also be understood as
sequentially linear, and thus as possible arrows in time.
Boundaries between these schools of thought are fuzzy
because any hierarchical system or theorizing on major
transitions produces a historical line-up which automati-
cally suggests a historical directionality; either in the way
order or organization comes about, going from lower levels
in a hierarchy to higher levels, or by undergoing major
restructuring in biological organization at different levels
in a hierarchy (that in turn coincide with the hypothesized
transitions).
This special issue exemplifies these intriguing problems
with three contributions. McShea starts with pointing out
the relationships that exist among complexity, hierarchy,
transitions and trends and goes on to delineate three major
trends in complexity; Guerrero and Berlanga use bio-
physical, ecological systems theoretical, and symbiological
jargon to describe how biogenesis is characterized by
autopoiesis, ecopoiesis and symbiogenesis which can also
be considered trends or patterns in natural history; and the
article by Watson and coworkers is a continuation of the
framework first introduced by Maynard Smith and Sza-
thmáry on major transitions.
McShea distinguishes three large-scare trends in com-
plexity: (1) complexity can increase vertically, which
involves a rise in structural complexity where parts become
embedded into wholes that form an increasingly nested
hierarchy; (2) complexity can increase horizontally, which
involves a numerical differentiation at the focal level (the
level below the whole); and (3) complexity can become
drained at the lowest levels of a nested hierarchy, as a
result of which differentiation and autonomy of the parts is
lost in favor of the ‘‘machinification’’ of the lowest levels.
In other words, once nested hierarchies become formed,
focal levels of that hierarchy first go through a division of
labor which results in differentiation, and this differentia-
tion eventually leads to a loss of autonomy of the indi-
vidual parts, in favor of a machinification of those lower
levels in function of the whole. The first large-scale trend
resembles the so-called major transitions of Maynard
Smith and Szathmáry who define the transitions based upon
information storage driven by selection. In con-
trast, McShea gives a structural definition of complexity
(Simon 1962).
McShea list numerous examples of these recurring pat-
terns in how complexity comes about. When, for example,
individual prokaryotic cells integrate into eukaryotic cells,
the eukaryotic cell becomes more complex and differenti-
ated into various structures, but during symbiogenesis,
integrated prokaryotic cells underwent gene loss and sub-
sequently lost their autonomy disabling them for survival
outside the cell and instead evolved into organelles where
they function as eukaryotic cell ‘‘machine parts.’’ The
functions performed by the organelles become more
streamlined in function of the eukaryotic cell, a process
that is also analyzed by Guerrero and Guerrerro.
In a second part of his paper, McShea investigates the
possibility of finding mechanistic explanations for these
trends. In the first trend, a higher-level object is formed
from lower-level objects, but such can be a mere outcome
of a rising maximum and the trend could be merely pas-
sive. The second trend always occurs at the focal level of a
hierarchy and can be causally explained by the zero-force
law (McShea and Brandon 2010) which can be driven by
selection for complexity or simply by the accumulation of
differences. The third trend is explained by selection
favoring the whole, thereby streamlining or stabilizing the
system. The three trends are framed in an increasingly
nested hierarchy and the author suggests the trends lend
insight into a repetitive causal cascade.
The phenomenon of symbiosis is not confined to the
origin of eukaryotic organelles which happened 2 billion
years ago, but is it a trend or recurring pattern in evolution?
This is the basic question raised by Guerrero and Berlanga
who answer in the affirmative. Biogenesis or the origin of
life is characterized by three major trends: autopoiesis,
ecopoiesis and symbiogenesis. Autopoiesis refers to the
capacity of organisms to self-maintain and reproduce while
ecopoiesis is the process whereby organisms interact with
their habitats in such a way that they selectively take up
compounds that enable them to self-maintain and excrete
metabolic products that in turn modify the environment.
Both autopoiesis and ecopoiesis lead to metabolic con-
nectivity between organisms which in turn drives
symbiogenesis.
Obligate symbiotic co-evolved dependencies character-
ize the transition from pro- to eukaryotes where individual
bionts (prokaryotes, the minimal unit of autopoiesis) unite
and form holobionts (integrated bionts) that demonstrate a
‘‘higher functional-structural complexity’’. Eukaryotic
organelles, while once bacteria themselves, have lost their
auto- and ecopoietic abilities and contribute to the auto-
and ecopoiesis of the holobiont.
Guerrero and Berlanga demonstrate that such charac-
terizations can also be applied to population and commu-
nity formation (biocenosis) in prokaryotes. Single
prokaryotes are rarely found in nature. Instead they form
complex multi-species communities (consortia) such as
microbial mats and other biofilms. Consortia are the min-
imal ecological unit that enables bacteria to sustain and the
authors list the basic principles or patterns that underlie
biocenosis. Individual bacterial adaptations are driven by
competition for nutrients, motility requirements, and
antibiotic resistance and these factors promote growth and
reproduction. At an ecological level, growth and repro-
duction result in population formation and environmental
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success becomes determined by an organism’s ability to
avoid, tolerate or defend against other individuals. Popu-
lations in turn deplete nutrients and accumulate waste
which causes for differentiation amongst the populations
which induces community formation. The authors go on to
demonstrate how prokaryotic consortia are responsible for
chemical gradient formation that underlies the major redox
(reduction–oxidation) reactions essential for all subse-
quently evolved life forms, and how they establish the
biogeochemical cycles.
Continuing the work on major transitions, the first
question Watson and coworkers ask, is given the major
transitions that have occurred—going from self-replicating
molecules to chromosomes to unicellular to multi-or-
ganelle eukaryotic cells to multicellular to eusocial
groups—what is common to all? Their answer is that all
levels of biological organization operate along the Dar-
winian principles (differential variation, inheritance, and
fitness/selection). Their second question is how the Dar-
winian principles operating at one level of biological
organization become recursively repeated at a higher level.
The authors begin their paper with examining how evo-
devo has altered our ideas on variation by introducing
notions such as evolvability; evo-eco has changed how we
understand the nature of the selective environment by
introducing ideas on ecosystem-levels of organization; and
discussions on biological individuality, what they call evo-
ego, have made us re-interpret the heritability of the evo-
lutionary unit.
Variation, individuality and environmental selection are
not fixed but are altered by developmental, reproductive,
and ecological network-like relations that introduce affor-
dances and constraints on how a system can evolve.
Modelling these network-like relations or ‘‘evolutionary
connectionism’’ as the authors call it, is mathematically
isomorphic to how scholars have modelled the evolution of
learning systems. Following Hebb’s (1949) learning
metaphor that states that ‘‘neurons that fire together wire
together’’ the authors examine how genes that are selected
together are wired together in gene-regulatory networks
(evo-devo); how two species that evolve in high density
together will strengthen ecological interactions; and the
more evolutionary units reproduce together, the more
reproductive dependencies arise between them. These
ecological interactions and reproductive dependencies
include symbiosis and holobiont formation, which is also
discussed by Guerrero and Berlanga as well as Sapp and
Casiraghi et al. ‘‘Correlation becomes causation’’ and
evolution alters which elements vary together (which gives
rise to a network that becomes an evolutionary unit), are
selected together (which leads to a network containing
multiple units), and are inherited together (the emergence
of a new biological individual out of a previous network)
leading to a positive feedback between evolutionary pro-
cesses and structural organizations that results in the
transformation and recreation of the Darwinian principles
at a higher level.
This characterization has implications for how we
understand natural selection. For one, it is a self-referential
system meaning that selection operating at a focal level will
alter how selection will occur at a higher level; and secondly,
given the functional analogy with learning systems, natural
selection itself can, as scholars such as Campbell
(1959, 1960, 1974a) and Riedl (1977, 1984) noted before, be
understood as a learning mechanism without working with
any foresight. The higher-level system emerges from selec-
tion operating at a lower level, and what becomes selected
are interactional patterns rather than entities.
The authors agree, natural history is characterized by a
recursive pattern where independent entities combine and
form new structures whereafter the individual components
lose autonomy. But it is intriguing how they use different
theoretical frameworks and a variety of mechanisms to
describe and explain the pattern in and of itself as well as
its repetition at various scales. While from an ontological
point of view it lends plausibility to the actual existence of
the pattern, from an epistemological point of view it
requires us to take on a more pluralistic stance on the
nature whereby evolutionary change comes about, at least
until a synthetic view is proposed that is able to combine
these diverse theories.
Natural Kinds, Biological Individuals
and the Units of Evolution
Any and all patterning of our observations and data into
scientific theories on the evolutionary trajectories taken by
natural kinds in history requires us to distinguish units
(structures) from their level in a hierarchy or location in the
‘‘real’’ world, and to determine the amount of randomness
or determinism by which these units and levels came about
(mechanisms) (Gontier 2010). The Darwinization of the
biological, linguistic and sociocultural sciences has been
accompanied with the units and levels of selection debate
(Lewontin 1970, Brandon 1982), a debate that associates
with inquiries into the nature and individuality of natural
kinds (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1980) and with finding the
‘‘logical skeleton’’ (Lewontin 1970) or ‘‘universal heuris-
tic’’ (Campbell 1974a) of natural selection in order for the
theory to be applicable to phenomena beyond genes such as
linguistic and sociocultural phenomena (Dawkins 1976).
Beyond natural selection, scholars today distinguish
numerous evolutionary processes and mechanisms,
including transformation, transduction, bacterial conjuga-
tion, gene transfer agents and the movement of mobile
438 Evol Biol (2016) 43:427–445
123
genetic elements that induce lateral gene flow (Lederberg
1952; Syvanen 1985; Doolittle 1999; Koonin et al. 2001;
Keeling and Palmer 2008; Woese 2004); hybridization and
introgression (Anderson and Stebbins 1954; Barton 1979;
Arnold et al. 2012); (hereditary) symbiosis that induces
evolution by symbiogenesis (Sagan 1967; Margulis 1970;
Bonen and Doolittle 1975, 1977; Zilber-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg 2008; Hotopp 2011; Brucker and Bordenstein
2012); genetic and ecological drift (Kimura 1968, 1983;
Hubbel 2001); and epigenetic and developmental mecha-
nisms and processes (McGinnis et al. 1984; Levins and
Lewontin 1985; Gould 1977; Gehring 1992; Goodwin and
Saunders 1992; Jablonka and Lamb 1995; Oyama et al.
2001; Odling-Smee et al. 2003; West-Eberhard 2003;
Gilbert and Epel 2008; Pigliucci and Müller 2010; Minelli
and Pradeu 2014).
Any and all of these findings have introduced new units,
not merely of selection but of evolution as it proceeds by
non-Darwinian mechanisms. This requires extended views
on how we define evolutionary individuals and the infor-
mation they contain and transmit, and it requires us to
differentiate numerous additional levels within the indi-
vidual itself, and its biotic and abiotic environment with
which it interacts. The old units and levels of selection
debate is therefore better characterized as the units, levels,
and mechanisms of evolution debate (Gontier 2010).
We already reviewed how Mesoudi, and Bradie and
Bouzat define and analyze cultural information, and
Kressing, de Voogt, and Morrison review how this cultural
information becomes transmitted. Guerrero and Berlanga’s
work on autopoiesis, ecopoiesis and symbiogenesis and the
associated emergence of holobionts; McShea’s work on
trends in complexity and hierarchy formation; and the
contribution of Watson et al., in particular in what regards
the various transitions in evo-ego they discuss, all have
implications for the units and levels of evolution debate,
how we can determine the mechanisms whereby these units
evolve at multiple levels of a hierarchy, and how higher-
levels of biological individuality come about. Here, we
focus on the contributions authored by Sapp, and Casiraghi
and co-authors, who review how especially reticulate
evolutionary theories, backed up by incoming data from
molecular genetic analyses, requires us to reconsider our
notions on biological individuality at an organismal and
species level.
Genes are major causal factors in the formation of
morphological structures which in turn enables us to dis-
tinguish organisms and species from one another. Today
however, organisms and the species they belong too, are
often identified and reduced to the genes they possess,
because each organism is argued to have a unique genetic
code, and to share more genes in common with its kin and
its own species then with others. In (meta-)barcoding
techniques (Hebert et al. 2003), for example, genes become
the exclusive measurement of distance between species.
Casiraghi and co-authors examine definitions of life,
they give an impressive list of the various species concepts
currently in use, and they examine the nature of organisms
and biological individuals in light of data acquired from
(next-generation) high throughput DNA-sequencing tech-
niques. Pedigrees and trees are nowadays exclusively build
upon shared gene sets, but while genetic homogeneity is
somewhat straightforward amongst eukaryotes taxa,
prokaryotes demonstrate genetic diversity both inter- and
intra-specifically. Lateral gene transfer disrupts vertical
transmission of the genetic code, making the transferrable
genes less-suited candidates to define and separate indi-
viduals and species from one another. Instead, organisms
such as E. coli appear to consist of a mosaic of various
genomes. And if living organisms are defined by their
genetic code, then Casiraghi et al. note, size cannot be
included as a defining feature because there exist viruses,
such as mega-viruses, that possess a larger genome than
some organisms.
As noted by Kolb, viruses are generally considered non-
living organisms because they are dependent upon a host
for replication, but Casiraghi and co-authors note that
intracellular symbionts are considered living entities, while
just like viruses they often depend upon their host for self-
maintenance and reproduction. Organelles also roam the
transition zone between the living and the dead, having
evolved from once free-living bacteria to subcellular dead
structures. Organellar evolution is also not confined to the
past, the currently smallest know intracellular symbionts,
i.e. Candidatus cicadicola found inside the insect Dicero-
procta semicincta, are also bacteria presumed to be in the
process of transitioning to organelles.
In the final part of their paper, the authors extend their
analysis to the notion of biological individuality and note
that in general, three criteria are used to define it: genetic
uniqueness, genetic homogeneity, and autonomy or phys-
iological independence. Huxley defined the individual
organism as any animal form that has a single life. On that
account a caterpillar is part of the same biological indi-
vidual as the butterfly even though they undergo transfor-
mations, and such identity, in the form of genetic
uniqueness, can today be measured by genes. But
monovular twins share the same genome although their life
path is different, and genes therefore cannot function as the
sole criteria to define genetic uniqueness. Other examples
discussed by the authors include mutagenesis and meta-
morphosis, somatic and germ cells, and processes of
symbiosis and symbiogenesis that, on a higher level of a
biological hierarchy, give way to ‘‘superorganisms’’ or
‘‘holobionts’’ that comprise a biological individual with
multiple genomes and thus, as Zilber-Rosenberg and
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Rosenberg (2008) call it, a hologenome. In such a higher
entity, the authors point out, autonomy, the third criterion
used to define biological individuality, also becomes
problematic.
Any and all reasoning on biological individuality needs
to invoke stances on parts and wholes, as well as how they
hierarchically relate to one another, in an either sequential
or embedded matter. Holobionts are examples par excel-
lence of higher-order individuals that embed smaller indi-
vidual bionts into new entities through the process of
hereditary symbiosis. Sapp examines how all eukaryotic
organisms are multi-genomic entities. Symbiosis obliges us
to re-conceptualize the presumed linear order scholars have
detected in time, because, as Sapp opens his article: ‘‘We
are genetic and physiological chimeras. We did not just
evolve from bacteria, we have evolved with them’’ (my
italics). By building on Margulis and Guerrero’s definition,
Sapp defines the holobiont as the host and its microbial
community that includes all symbiotic viruses and
microorganisms, while following the Rosenberg’s, the
hologenome is defined by the sum of all genomes present
in the host (its own as well as those of its viral and
microbial community). Sapp urges for a new understanding
of the biological individual as a ‘‘dynamic, multispecies
community-based’’ entity.
The author contributes a rich historical overview of the
context wherein symbiosis research evolved, and critically
analyzes the recent literature on holobiont and hologenome
selection. He concludes that the holobiont is not merely a
co-evolved and cooperating superunit, both the holobiont
and its components evolve by a variety of mechanisms, and
thus all are possible units, not merely of selection, but also
of hereditary symbiosis and drift.
Sapp goes on to demonstrate the relevance of ‘‘sym-
biomics’’ over ‘‘genomics’’ in understanding evolution,
ecology, physiology, morphogenesis and the behavior of
biological organisms. Incoming data on the role the
microbiological world plays in health and disease, by and
large acquired by molecular techniques, no longer make it
tenable that ‘‘germs’’ straightforwardly correlate to disease.
Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
From an epistemic point of view, process and pattern have
often been polarized in association with a favoring of
micro-versus macro-oriented levels of analysis, synchronic
versus diachronic research, and reductionism versus hol-
ism. Process and pattern debates furthermore associate with
discussions on ontogeny versus phylogeny, the use of tree
versus network analyses, and whether the goal of science is
to provide descriptions of how the world is, or to explain
why it is the way it is. What this special issue makes clear
most of all is that there exists an intrinsic relation between
pattern and process and the same goes for all other
dichotomies. One can prefer to analyze a subject matter
from within one particular stance, but one cannot theorize
either stance without the other. That is true for all binary
oppositions, and over the years, we have reconceptualized
the oppositions as two extreme ends of a long spectrum.
While debates have run high in the past, today, we are
reaching an era where scholars are more willing to cross
their classic disciplinary boundaries, and they do so with
good reason. None of the various approaches used to study
evolution are more or less scientific, and tenets in all
schools of thought have either been proven by observations
or experiments, or they have so far not been falsified. In the
end, the various approaches necessitate a pluralistic view
on evolution. A pluralistic view on particular subjects in
turn enables us to take on a comparative stance which only
benefits insight into the problem. And such a comparative
investigation might on a higher level itself serve as a means
to unify the sciences.
Secondly, it is interesting to find out that no matter how
different the epistemological framework one works in, and
regardless of whether one studies biological or sociocul-
tural evolution, from a micro- or macrolevel of analysis,
and focusing either on vertical or reticulate evolution, there
remains a core of problems that all scholars want to solve.
Beyond defining the subject area (what is life, culture,
language, or how do we define species, organisms or
sociocultural traits), scholars attempt to discover the units,
levels and mechanisms of evolution, how we define
information exchange, and how these elements, loci and
processes organize themselves in nature as well as how
they interact. In other words, there does exist a core set of
problems that is inherent to all evolutionary sciences. But
because scholars have been working from within different
schools of thought, and at different levels of the hierar-
chical scale, this core set of problems has seldom been
defined or taken as point of analysis in and of itself.
Establishing such a framework would be beneficial for all
fields involved.
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that a majority of scholars
active in both the sociocultural and biological research
community have long favored reductionist, mechanical,
functional-structuralist and micro- or mesolevel analyses
and explanations. Current debates on the scope and ade-
quacy of the modern synthesis, or the ‘‘Darwinization’’ or
incorporation of general evolutionary thought within the
sociocultural sciences is accompanied with an incorpora-
tion of more holistic, ecological, ontogenetic, and macro-
level analyses and with new means to model not only the
entities but the interactions and transitions between them.
Given that at the onset of evolutionary thought, in the
nineteenth century, biologists, anthropologists and linguists
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already averred the implementation of evolutionary
thought to understand these phenomena, we are left with
the question why early attempts failed, and why the com-
munity has long resisted them.
Numerous authors in this volume discuss the unilineal-
ism or orthogenetic views presented in early biological and
sociocultural schools of thought, as well as the difficult
nature associated with incorporating ontogeny, ecology or
symbiology into the standard paradigm. Gontier provides
an additional reason for why such incorporation was dif-
ficult. Non-paradigmatic evolutionary models associated
with an extended synthesis endorse different notions on
causality, and these notions derive from different ways in
how we can conceptualize time and space.
She first investigates how our species has conceptual-
ized time and space and distinguishes four different cos-
mologies and three major transitions in time thinking.
Time was originally considered to be cyclical, later it was
understood to be linear and absolute and today, in physics,
time is conflated with space into a single space–time con-
tinuum which questions the very existence of time while
there exists a somewhat consensus view amongst philoso-
phers, neurocognitive scientists and linguists that the
capacity to experience time is a cognitively evolved trait.
In association, space was conceptualized as the locus where
change occurred, and change was understood as the
movement of matter in space and time.
The evolutionary sciences find their origin in natural
history research, an enterprise that was fascinated with the
problem of time. Following classical Aristotelian physics,
time was defined as matter in motion, and following Des-
cartes, causality was defined as linear. Linear time-thinking
enabled early history scholars to use the sequential line-up
of fossils in the consecutive layers of the earth’s strata to
define the evolution of species, while the historical suc-
cession of languages and cultures defined the evolution of
the sociocultural domain. It is the natural history scholars’
notion of time that enabled the introduction of diachroni-
cally oriented (dating) studies into the origin of natural
kinds.
The author demonstrates how different notions of time
bring forth different notions of causality and how they
generate different means to model and calculate the evo-
lutionary distance between natural kinds. Both time and
causality have for the most part of history been considered
unidirectional and unilineal, and both concepts enable for
uniformitarian and mechanical explanations on how spe-
cies evolve, as well as linear timelines and phylogenetic
tree models that demonstrate vertical patterns of evolution.
The different ideas associated with an extended syn-
thesis underlie different time notions. Fields such as ecol-
ogy, symbiology and evo-devo investigate processes such
as emergence, reversed directionality, up- and downward
causation that occur in the present, and such horizontal
interactions induce perturbations in otherwise unilineal
systems that are modelled by making use of networks and
non-linear dynamic system theories. These approaches also
mark shifts from mechanical to statistical thinking, because
the number of parameters that are taken into account to
calculate change become so numerous that straightforward
predictions for future change are near to impossible. Tree
to network modelling, mechanical to statistical thinking,
and genealogy to economy thinking is underlain by dif-
ferent notions of time; and these transitions in epistemo-
logical approaches associate with the introduction of new
parameters that are used to time evolutionary events; from
the earth’s strata and natural historical events to molecular
clocks, the organisms themselves and the interactions they
entertain.
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